



REPÚBLICA DEMOCRÁTICA DE  
**TIMOR-LESTE**

**10º Aniversário da Consulta Popular  
de 30 de Agosto de 1999**

**Konsulta Popular 30 Agostu 1999  
Tinan 10**

**10<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the Popular Consultation  
of 30<sup>th</sup> August 1999**

Os últimos passos da

# **Libertação Nacional**

Cronologia

Hakat ikus nian ba

# **Libertasaun Nasional**

Kronolojia

On the verge of

# **National Liberation**

Chronology



10º Aniversário da Consulta Popular de 30 de Agosto de 1999

Konsulta Popular 30 Agosto 1999 - Tinan 10

10<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the Popular Consultation of 30<sup>th</sup> August 1999



Edição

Secretaria de Estado do Conselho de Ministros

Design & Artes Gráficas

**ida** Imagem, Design & Arquitectura, Lda.

Editado por ocasião das Comemorações do  
10º Aniversário da Consulta Popular de 30 de Agosto de 1999

Agosto de 2009

On the verge of  
**National  
Liberation**

10<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the Popular Consultation  
30<sup>th</sup> August 1999

**Chronology**  
5<sup>th</sup> May 1999 – 4<sup>th</sup> September 1999

# Introduction

*On the 30<sup>th</sup> August 1999, with courage and determination the people of Timor-Leste voted at the Popular Consultation. Finally, after 24 years of Indonesian occupation, the Timorese overwhelmingly expressed their wish for independence of their territory.*

*This publication, launched on the occasion of the Celebration of the 10<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the Popular Consultation, aims at enhancing the extraordinary endurance and bravery of the Timorese people, by chronologically relating the events that took place over the period between May 5<sup>th</sup> and September 4<sup>th</sup>, 1999, which led to their self determination.*

*It is opportune to frame this chronology within the context of the historical events that led to the signature of the May 5<sup>th</sup>, 1999 Agreements, and those that took place after the announcement of the results of the Popular Consultation, culminating in May 2002 with Timor Leste's independence as a Nation.*

*Timor-Leste remained a Portuguese colony for a period of four centuries. This situation was changed on December 7<sup>th</sup> 1975 when the Indonesian military forces invaded the territory, followed by the proclamation of the integration of Timor-Leste into Indonesia, as its 27<sup>th</sup> province by President Suharto on July 17<sup>th</sup>, 1976.*

*Xanana Gusmão, leader of the timorese resistance since 1979, is captured on the 20<sup>th</sup> November 1992 and sentenced to life imprisonment for rebellion, sentence that would later be commuted to 20 years in prison.*

*Despite this setback and from Cipinang prison, Xanana Gusmão continued to be the command and symbol of hope in the fight for Timor-Leste's independence. His continuous activism, appealing to calm and to non-violent resistance, elevated his profile and that of the Timorese Resistance, before the international community.*





*During the occupation period, extensive human rights violations against the population were committed by the Indonesian Military. For years, such a situation received little or no attention from the international community.*

*Timor-Leste's fate unexpectedly changed due to developments in the international political arena, which related to the fall of the Suharto regime.*

*For over a decade, talks between Indonesia and Portugal started in July 1983 mediated by the United Nations Secretary-General brought about few results. The swearing-in of the new Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, ushered in a new determination to the United Nations efforts.*

*The fact that Bishop Ximenes Belo, then Apostolic Administrator in Dili and José Ramos Horta, spokesman of the Timorese resistance were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1996, aroused more interest and pressure from the international media towards the East Timor problem.*

*In June 1997, South Africa's President, Nelson Mandela, visits Xanana Gusmão in prison, contributing to the rise of Timor-Leste's visibility in the international scenario.*

*Meanwhile, the constitution of the National Council of the Timorese Resistance (CNRT), under Xanana Gusmão's leadership, made the independence movement more united.*

*Suharto's successor, President Habibie declared he was prepared to grant Timor-Leste a special autonomy status. Following this new stance, at the end of 1998, the Australian Prime Minister, John Howard sent a letter to President Habibie urging Indonesia to consider the wish of the Timorese for self determination.*

*The condition was thus created that led to the negotiation followed by the signature of the May 5<sup>th</sup> Agreements between the Portuguese and Indonesian Governments, regarding the definition of the procedure for the Popular Consultation.*

*The arrival of the INTERFET, in September, came in response to the wave of violence unleashed after the announcement of the results of the Popular Consultation and, in October 1999 the Indonesian invasion came to an end, exactly as it had started – with violence and bloodshed.*

*As the year 1999 began, the UNTAET (the United Nations' Transitory Administration in Timor-Leste) takes up the task of administering the territory. The situation changes with the establishment of the National Consultative Council (composed of representatives of the various segments of the Timorese society), which regulates the creation of the Transitional Cabinet, made up of Timorese leaders and representatives of the UNTAET.*

*Exactly two years after the Popular Consultation, on August 30<sup>th</sup>, 2000, the Timorese are called to the polls again, this time to elect the members of the Constitutional Assembly. This became the first democratic electoral poll in the territory.*

*The Constitutional Assembly thus substituted the Transitional Cabinet as the first institution, exclusively Timorese, responsible for the administration of the territory and at the plenary session of March 22<sup>nd</sup>, 2002, it approved the Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste.*

*On May 20<sup>th</sup>, 2002, a date that will remain forever in history, Timor-Leste became an independent Nation with Xanana Gusmão as its President.*





# Chronology

5<sup>th</sup> May 1999 – 4<sup>th</sup> September 1999





May 99

05 May

After a long process of diplomatic negotiations, Portugal and Indonesia, conclude three agreements in New York on 5<sup>th</sup> May 1999<sup>1</sup>:

- Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the Portuguese Republic on the question of East Timor;
- Agreement regarding the modalities for the popular consultation of the East Timorese through a direct ballot; and
- East Timor popular consultation: Agreement on security.

Portugal, represented by Jaime Gama, Minister Foreign Affairs, Indonesia, represented by Ali Alatas, Minister of Foreign Affairs<sup>2</sup>, under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, sign in New York<sup>3</sup>, the agreements that define the principal modalities of the “popular consultation”, scheduled for the 8<sup>th</sup> August 1999<sup>4</sup>.

The two governments, Portugal and Indonesia, entrust the Secretary-General with organizing and conducting the “popular consultation” in order to ascertain whether the East Timorese people accept or reject a special autonomy for East Timor within the unitary Republic of Indonesia<sup>5</sup>.

The European Union, through its Presidency, and on East Timor and the New York Agreements, declares the following:

*“The European Union warmly acclaims the signature, in New York, on the 5<sup>th</sup> of May, (...) of the agreement regarding the future of East Timor. The proposed agreement constitutes a substantial advance in the resolution of a problem that has long been remised. In this context, Xanana Gusmão’s immediate release is an essential factor to the success of the consultation process. The EU complements the tireless efforts of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to find a global and internationally acceptable solution for the East Timor issue. (...)”*

### **Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the Portuguese Republic on the Question of East Timor**

*The Governments of Indonesia and Portugal, Recalling General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV), 1541(XV), 2625(XXV) and the relevant resolutions and decisions adopted by the Security Council and the General Assembly on the question of East Timor;*

*Bearing in mind the sustained efforts of the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal since July 1983, through the good offices of the Secretary-General, to find a just, comprehensive and internationally acceptable solution to the question of East Timor;*

*Recalling the agreement of 5 August 1998 to undertake, under the auspices of the Secretary-General, negotiations on a special status based on a wide-ranging autonomy for East Timor without prejudice to the positions of principle of the respective Governments on the final status of East Timor;*

*Having discussed a constitutional framework for an autonomy for East Timor on the basis of a draft presented by the United Nations, as amended by the Indonesian Government;*

*Noting the position of the Government of Indonesia that the proposed special autonomy should be implemented only as an end solution to the question of East Timor with full recognition of Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor;*

*Noting the position of the Government of Portugal that an autonomy regime should be transitional, not requiring recognition of Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor or the removal of East Timor from the list of Non-Self-Governing Territories of the General Assembly, pending a final decision on the status of East Timor by the East Timorese people through an act of self-determination under United Nations auspices;*

*Taking into account that although the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal each have their positions of principle on the prepared proposal for special autonomy, both agree that it is essential to move the peace process forward, and that therefore, the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal agree that the Secretary-General should consult the East Timorese people on the constitutional framework for autonomy attached hereto as an annex;*

*Bearing in mind that the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal requested the Secretary-General to devise the method and procedures for the popular consultation through a direct, secret and universal ballot;*

**Agree as follows:**

EN

EN

07 May





**Article 1**

*Request the Secretary-General to put the attached proposed constitutional framework providing for a special autonomy for East Timor within the unitary Republic of Indonesia to the East Timorese people, both inside and outside East Timor, for their consideration and acceptance or rejection through a popular consultation on the basis of a direct, secret and universal ballot.*

**Article 2**

*Request the Secretary-General to establish, immediately after the signing of this Agreement, an appropriate United Nations mission in East Timor to enable him to effectively carry out the popular consultation.*

**Article 3**

*The Government of Indonesia will be responsible for maintaining peace and security in East Timor in order to ensure that the popular consultation is carried out in a fair and peaceful way in an atmosphere free of intimidation, violence or interference from any side.*

**Article 4**

*Request the Secretary-General to report the result of the popular consultation to the Security Council and the General Assembly, as well as to inform the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal and the East Timorese people.*

**Article 5**

*If the Secretary-General determines, on the basis of the result of the popular consultation and in accordance with this Agreement, that the proposed constitutional framework for special autonomy is acceptable to the East Timorese people, the Government of Indonesia shall initiate the constitutional measures necessary for the implementation of the constitutional framework, and the Government of Portugal shall initiate within the United Nations the procedures necessary for the removal of*

*East Timor from the list of Non-Self-Governing Territories of the General Assembly and the deletion of the question of East Timor from the agendas of the Security Council and the General Assembly.*

**Article 6**

*If the Secretary-General determines, on the basis of the result of the popular consultation and in accordance with this Agreement, that the proposed constitutional framework for special autonomy is not acceptable to the East Timorese people, the Government of Indonesia shall take the constitutional steps necessary to terminate its links with East Timor thus restoring under Indonesian law the status East Timor held prior to 17 July 1976, and the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal and the Secretary-General shall agree on arrangements for a peaceful and orderly transfer of authority in East Timor to the United Nations. The Secretary-General shall, subject to the appropriate legislative mandate, initiate the procedure enabling East Timor to begin a process of transition towards independence.*

**Article 7**

*During the interim period between the conclusion of the popular consultation and the start of the implementation of either option, the parties request the Secretary-General to maintain an adequate United Nations presence in East Timor.*

*DONE in New York on this 5th day of May, 1999.*

*For the Government of Indonesia:*

*/s/ Ali Alatas Minister for Foreign Affairs of Indonesia*

*For the Government of Portugal:*

*/s/ Jaime Gama Minister for Foreign Affairs of Portugal*

*Witnessed:*

*/s/ Kofi A. Annan Secretary-General United Nations*





18 May

More than thirty persons are killed by the militia in Atara<sup>4</sup>.

22 May

The Secretary-General proposes the establishment of the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET), to organize and carry through with the “popular consultation”. It is composed by 241 international staff members, 420 United Nations volunteers (electoral staff), 280 civil police members, 50 military liaison officers and around 4000 Timorese electoral staff<sup>7</sup>.

The UNAMET Electoral Unit, responsible for the activities pertaining voter registration and voting, is composed by its coordinator, 16 regional coordinators and 400 electoral staff<sup>7</sup>.

At the same time, the Electoral Commission is established, composed by 3 international experts, an independent organ responsible for the evaluation of the consultation process and with competency to attend to complaints, appeals and claims. Later on, the Secretary-General nominates, as commissioners, Johan Kriegler (South Africa), Patrick Bradley (Northern Ireland) and Sohn Bong-Scuk (Korea)<sup>7</sup>.

28 May

The Justice and Peace Commission reports that the militia are in the process of drawing up a list of separatist leaders with the help of the Indonesia intelligence services<sup>4</sup>.

June 99

01 June

Arrival, in Dili, of Ian Martin, the new representative of the UN Secretary-General on the East Timor issue<sup>4</sup>.

03 June

UNAMET, headed by Ian Martin, began operations in Dili<sup>8</sup>.

UN flag raised at headquarters of UN mission in Dili<sup>9</sup>.

Indonesian legislative elections. GOLKAR, the party of former president Suharto and his successor B. J. Habibie, is defeated for the first time<sup>4</sup>.

For the Indonesian elections, 420 136 voters were registered in Timor Leste<sup>1</sup>.

The Security Council establishes UNAMET (United Nations Assistance Mission in East Timor) to supervise the referendum<sup>4</sup>.

The Security Council formally establishes UNAMET through to the end of August 1999. In resolution 1246 (1999) adopted unanimously, the Council endorses the Secretary-General's proposal for a mission including up to 280 civilian police officers to advise the Indonesian Police, as well as 50 military liaison officers to maintain contact with the Indonesian Armed Forces. The Council stresses again the responsibility of the Indonesian Government in the maintenance of peace and security in East Timor to ensure the integrity of the ballot and the security of international staff and observers<sup>7</sup>.

The Australian foreign affairs minister confirms having information proving that the Indonesian army actively encourages and supports the militia<sup>4</sup>.

Ian Martin declares that tens of thousands of Timorese had to flee following the violence of the militia backed by Indonesia<sup>4</sup>, creating a “serious obstacle” to preparations for the vote on the future of the Territory<sup>5</sup>.

Commission on Peace and Stability agrees that militias and FALINTIL will disarm<sup>9</sup>.

04 June

07 June

11 June

18 June



EN

EN





22 June

Secretary-General reports that continuing violence by pro-integration militia means that the necessary conditions do not exist to begin the operational phases of the consultation process. Opening of the registration is postponed by three weeks<sup>9</sup>.

23 June

Reporting to the Security Council, the Secretary-General says that security conditions and the lack of a level playing field do not allow for the consultation process to go forward. Registration is delayed to 13<sup>th</sup> July to allow time for the deployment of UN staff throughout the Territory and to give Indonesian authorities time to address the pending security concerns<sup>5</sup>.

25 June

Beginning of the Dare II Peace and Reconciliation Meeting in Jakarta<sup>9</sup>.

29 June

UNAMET's Maliana office attacked by militia<sup>9</sup>.

30 June

End of the Dare II Peace and Reconciliation Meeting in Jakarta agrees on disarmament of militia and FALINTIL and respect for outcome of the popular consultation, but fails to agree on procedure for follow-up<sup>9</sup>.

July 99

03 July

Confidential document drafted by the Indonesian Dili Task Force (Foreign Ministry representation) entitled "Evaluation of the situation in case Option 1 fails". The document starts with the pessimistic point of view regarding the possibility of autonomy (option 1) winning in the popular consultation and evaluates the situation in the territory in case option 1 failed<sup>1</sup>.

04 July

The Besi Merah Putih militia attacks a humanitarian convoy in Liquiça (this attack is subject to trial during the month of August, by the Dili Court)<sup>1</sup>.

## DARE II

Jakarta, June 25-30, 1999

"SORU MUTU BA DAME NEON IDA DEIT"

### Preamble

*With Praise to God, the Almighty, who offers life and peace to mankind;*

*With deep concern for the sufferings of the people of Timor Lorosae;*

*Aware of the responsibility to find a lasting settlement of the question of Timor Lorosae in a critical moment of its history;*

*Inspired by recent developments, globally as well as within Indonesia, in human rights and democracy;*

*With sincere appreciation of the efforts of the Church in Timor Lorosae, in particular the efforts of Bishop Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo and Bishop Basilio do Nascimento, to initiate and promote dialogue and reconciliation;*

*Grateful to the Government of Indonesia for its endorsement of choice of Jakarta as the venue for Dare II;*

*With similar thanks to friendly nations, non governmental organisations and Church organisations for the moral and material support that has made Dare II possible;*

*Recognising the efforts of the international community, through the United Nations, to settle the question of Timor Lorosae in a manner that is peaceful and acceptable to all parties, in accordance with the Agreement of May 5, 1999;*

*Recognising the need to reaffirm previous commitments to peace and reconciliation;*

*We, the participants of Dare II, declare our determination, before God and future generations of Timor Lorosae, to;*

- *Establish a platform of common positions with the purpose of finding a durable solution to the question of Timor Lorosae,*
- *Develop a deeper understanding of our positions with a view expanding the platform of common positions.*

### Points of Convergence

#### I. Politics

**1) Timor Lorosae is facing a new era of transparency, democracy and globalisation, in Indonesia and throughout the world.**



2) Timor Lorosae has a history of political strife filled with conflict and violence that has had an impact on all levels of social life.

3) Political change in Indonesia and international developments, both geopolitical as well as those that are occurring within the United Nations, have contributed to an acceleration of the process of seeking a final, comprehensive resolution of the Timor Lorosae question that is acceptable to the international community.

4) Every individual in Timor Lorosae has civil, political, social, culture, religious and economic rights.

## II. Security

1) To observe the bilateral agreement signed on June 18, 1999.

2) To declare that the Indonesian Police Force (Polri) is the only authority responsible for security and public order during the entire popular consultation process, in accordance with the agreement of May 5, 1999.

## III. Reconciliation

1) All parties agree on the need for reconciliation.

2) Only dialogue and true reconciliation can develop consensus, making it possible to avoid conflict, and guaranteeing social life in an atmosphere of democracy, in which differences in ideas and perceptions are respected.

3) There must be an on-going dialogue process involving all political opinions and aspirations, in order to build a climate of tolerance.

## IV. Popular Consultation

1) To emphasize the importance of all parties giving priority to the interests of the people of Timor Lorosae, in the process of conducting the popular consultation.

2) There must be good coordination with UNAMET and all responsible parties involved in the process of conducting the popular consultation.

3) The Indonesian Police must play a constructive role.

4) All involved parties must respect all signed agreements, by fully supporting UNAMET in carrying out its UN mandate.

5) Urges UNAMET to maintain its neutrality throughout the process of the popular consultation.

6) Urges the Armed Forces of Indonesia to be absolutely neutral throughout the process of the popular consultation, in accordance with the agreement of May 5, 1999.

7) Agree to accept the officially validated outcome of the popular consultation, in accordance with the agreement of May 5, 1999.

Following the attacks on UN personnel in Maliana and Liquiça, Security Council members demand an immediate halt to the violence and intimidation carried out by the militia in the territory<sup>5</sup>.

Mary Robinson, the United Nations human rights High Commissioner, declares that she is worried about the attacks against the UN personnel by armed militia<sup>4</sup>.

FALINTIL proposes a new cease-fire<sup>4</sup>.

Delegation of Indonesian ministers visits Dili<sup>9</sup>.

General Wiranto, commander in chief of the Indonesian armed forces, refuses an interim force of the UN<sup>4</sup>.

After several delays due to violence, enrolment on the electoral rolls for the referendum finally begins<sup>4</sup>, after a three-day delay to allow Indonesian authorities to address the security situation<sup>9</sup>.

A report dated 3<sup>rd</sup> July 1999 signed by H R Garnadi, assistant to the Minister for Internal Politics and Security, is disclosed to UNAMET and the media. The report outlined plans for evacuation of all Indonesian officials and pro-Indonesian residents of East Timor and destruction of vital facilities, and predicted social chaos<sup>8</sup>.

The Secretary-General's report mentions that the intimidating activities of the pro-integration militias force the displacement of many timorese and strongly limit the capacity of the independence supporters to express themselves freely. The internal displaced persons "continue to constitute a serious threat to a credible process of consultation"<sup>10</sup>.

06 July

08 July

10 July

12 July

14 July

16 July

19 July

20 July







25 July

239,893 East Timorese have registered in first ten days. Registration continues on the understanding that Indonesian authorities will achieve further improvements in security situation and address problem of internally displaced persons, now estimated at 60,000<sup>9</sup>.

28 July

The absence of security conditions delays the popular consultation date from 8<sup>th</sup> August to 30<sup>th</sup> August<sup>11</sup>.

## August 99

04 August

Voter registration ends<sup>3</sup>. The voter's registration was voluntary, in person and specific for the popular consultation. It was done during 22 consecutive days, 8 hours a day, in 200 centers in the 13 East Timor districts and also in the 13 centers abroad<sup>1</sup>.

05 August

UNAMET registers 451.792 potential voters, of a population of 800.000 in East Timor and abroad<sup>5</sup>.

06 August

Registration closes in East Timor after two-day extension: 446,666 people registered, 433,576 in East Timor itself and 13,090 at external centers<sup>9</sup>.

09 August

Supporters and opponents of the autonomy proposal for East Timor sign a code of conduct for the campaign period leading up to the ballot on 30<sup>th</sup> August<sup>5</sup>.

10 August

FALINTIL unilateral cantonment, obeying to the instructions of the Fighting Command (Comando da Luta), resist to provocations of the military forces and the militias<sup>12</sup>.

12 August

FALINTIL completes cantonment at four sites<sup>9</sup>.

Campaigning for the popular consultation begins<sup>3</sup> and regional campaign committees established<sup>9</sup>.

The autonomy supporters constituted a United Front for Autonomy (UNIF), including the several pro-autonomy parties such as BRTT, FPDK and also PPI (political front of pro-integration militias). The independence supporters are represented by the National Council of the Timorese Resistance (CNRT)<sup>1</sup>.

Beginning of the "Laying down of arms" at militia parades<sup>9</sup>.

The militias attack the CNRT headquarters in Dili<sup>1</sup>.

In response to an upsurge in militia activity, SRSG Ian Martin, Ambassador Agus Tarmidzi, Chairman of the Indonesian Task Force, and senior Indonesian police officials visit Viqueque, Suai and Maliana, where they discuss additional security measures with local police, military and administration<sup>5</sup>.

The militias attack a group of students in Maliana<sup>1</sup>.

Ian Martin, the representative of the UN Secretary-General for East Timor, demands the withdrawal of the Indonesian officers actively involved with the militia<sup>4</sup>.

East Timorese leaders from pro-independence and pro-autonomy groups agree to establish a 25-person commission to foster reconciliation and cooperation in the Territory until the results of the UN-run autonomy ballot are implemented<sup>5</sup>.

End of the "Laying down of arms" at militia parades<sup>9</sup>.

Beginning of voter lists displayed at registration centers<sup>9</sup>.

14 August

16 August

17 August

18 August

19 August



EN

EN



## 20 August

The militias attack the CNRT headquarters in Manatuto, a group of students and a group of displaced persons in Suai<sup>1</sup>.

Violence mars campaigning in East Timor as pro-integration militia harass people attending a pro-independence rally in Suai. In Manatuto, military liaison officers serving with UNAMET are threatened by militia<sup>5</sup>.

The new outbreak of violence gives rise to fears that the referendum cannot take place before the end of UNAMET's term, fixed for the end of August<sup>4</sup>.

East Timorese leaders from pro-autonomy and pro-independence groups agree to establish twenty-five member commission to promote reconciliation and stability after the ballot<sup>9</sup>.

End of voter lists displayed at registration centers<sup>8</sup>.

Indonesian authorities assure UNAMET that they will try to create a secure environment. Members of the Security Council express strong concern at the continuing campaign of intimidation and violence in East Timor and call on the parties to fulfil their commitments to disarm and store their weapons<sup>7</sup>.

The UN Security Council extends the term of UNAMET to November 30<sup>th</sup>, 1999<sup>4</sup>.

SRSF Ian Martin tells a press conference in Dili that the UN intends to proceed with the vote despite spate of deadly violence<sup>7</sup>.

The militias attack the CNRT headquarters in Dili<sup>1</sup>.

Eurico Guterres, one of the main pro-Indonesian militia leaders, declares to fifteen thousand of his supporters that East Timor will become a "sea of fire" if the separatists win<sup>4</sup>.

The recently appointed Indonesian military commander for East Timor, Colonel Noer Muis, states to the Jakarta Post that "Indonesia will abandon the territory in a peaceful way and will transfer the administration, including all vital installations, to the United Nations, in a civilized way"<sup>1</sup>.

In New York, Indonesia's representative, in a meeting of the Security Council, pledges his country's commitment to ensuring that there is a safe environment, as called for in the 5<sup>th</sup> May agreements<sup>7</sup>.

The Security Council extends UNAMET's mandate until 30 November. In a unanimous vote, the Council adopts resolution 126 (1999), endorsing the Secretary-General's proposal to restructure the UN Mission in East Timor for the interim phase after the 30<sup>th</sup> August vote<sup>5</sup>.

Resurgence of militia violence culminates in rampage in Dili; CNRT office sacked<sup>9</sup>.

End of the electoral campaign period, initiated on the 14<sup>th</sup> of August<sup>1</sup>.

UNAMET facilitates an historic meeting between the pro-independence fighters of FALINTIL and the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) at the main FALINTIL cantonment site in East Timor<sup>5</sup>.

The UNAMET mandate is extended with increased numbers of military liaison officers and police<sup>9</sup>.

## 22 August

## 23 August

## 24 August

## 26 August

## 27 August







## 28 August

The militias attack CNRT headquarters in Los Palos<sup>1</sup>.

Ali Alatas, Indonesian foreign affairs minister, rejects the proposal of sending a peacekeeping force<sup>4</sup>.

The militias attack CNRT headquarters in Oecussi<sup>1</sup>.

## 29 August

On the eve of the popular consultation, the Secretary-General issues an appeal to the people of East Timor, calling on all sides to “live up to their responsibilities before history”<sup>5</sup>.

FALINTIL and militia leaders publicly commit themselves not to carry weapons outside cantonment sites. Indonesian police and military promise enforcement<sup>9</sup>.

Reuters news agency releases the news that Indonesian armed forces state they cannot guarantee 100% that they will maintain security in East Timor “if a situation of chaos occurs, involving a vast number of people, since there will always exist unhealthy rivalries and provocations between the two groups in question, which is not possible to avoid most of the times<sup>1</sup>.”

The voting begins at 6.30 and finishes at 16.00, around 9.00 am almost 50% of registered voters had already voted throughout the territory. UNAMET managed to organize the popular consultation in a record time period and with a considerable success in the electoral point of view<sup>1</sup>.

Several acts of violence force the closing of seven polling booths momentarily in the district of Ermera<sup>4</sup>.

At least 95 per cent of registered voters cast their ballots, a total of more than 430.000<sup>5</sup>.

UNAMET polling staff murdered at Atsabe<sup>9</sup>.

Ali Alatas, the Indonesian foreign affairs minister, lauds the manner in which the referendum was conducted<sup>4</sup>.

Members of the East Timorese Consultative Commission meet for the first time. The group is composed of 10 members each from the pro-independence and pro-autonomy camps, as well as 5 members appointed by the UN Secretary-General<sup>5</sup>.

East Timorese Consultative Commission is boycotted by most pro-autonomy hard-liners<sup>9</sup>.

The UNIF protest to the UNAMET that the voting process has been “illegitimate” and “unfair” (Letter of 31<sup>st</sup> August). These accusations are considered by the Electoral Commission as totally unfounded<sup>1</sup>.

The militia attack the cities of Dili, Gleno, Aileu, Ermera, Ambeno, and Maliana. Three Timorese members of the UNAMET team are killed<sup>4</sup>.

## 31 August

## 30 August

### Day of the Referendum



*“Since the first hours of daybreak, and in some cases since the day before, the roads in East Timor filled with people with their voting and/or identity card proudly in their hand, on their way to the 200 voting centers and to more than 700 ballot tables, to exercise their voting right, some taking their whole family with them. Practically nobody remained home on the 30<sup>th</sup> August<sup>1</sup> (...).”*





# September 99

## 01 September

Violence erupts outside the UNAMET compound in Dili as militia members attack pro-independence supporters<sup>5</sup>.

Militia violence and killings in Dili; journalists attacked<sup>9</sup>.

## 02 September

Special UN envoy, Jamsheed Marker, asks the Security Council to be prepared to send an international intervention force later on<sup>4</sup>.

Pro-integration militias, at times with the support of elements of the Indonesian security forces, launch a campaign of violence, looting and arsoning throughout the entire Territory<sup>5</sup>.

Two more UNAMET local staff murdered amid militia violence in Maliana<sup>9</sup>.

The United Nations Secretary-General announces, to the Security Council and the world, the results of the popular consultation<sup>13</sup>.

Electoral Commission considers allegations of irregularities at public hearing and concludes process not impaired<sup>9</sup>.

General Wiranto announces that in order to be prepared for "any possible circumstances," two new battalions (2 thousand men) had been sent to East Timor<sup>4</sup>.

## 04 September

Official announcement of the results in Dili: 94,388 or 21.5 per cent of East Timorese voted in favour of the special autonomy proposal and 344,580 or 78.5 per cent voted against. A total of 446,953 East Timorese cast their ballots within and outside the Territory<sup>5</sup>.


Election results announced at Mahkota Hotel, in Dili<sup>3</sup>, having the timorese chosen their future freely and opted for independence by a clear majority<sup>1</sup>.

Violence provoked by the militia and the Indonesia army obliges all the UN personnel to take shelter in Dili<sup>4</sup>.

U.S. CIVPOL officer is wounded during UNAMET evacuation from Liquiça<sup>9</sup>.

TNI/militia onslaught begins within an hour, causing most foreigners to flee<sup>3</sup>.

Campaign of violence, including killings and rape, looting and arson, launched throughout Timor-Leste<sup>5</sup>.



EN 03 September

EN





# Results

## DISTRICTS (ADMINISTRATIVE REGIONS)

DISTRICTS (ADMINISTRATIVE REGIONS)	UNAMET REGIONS	REGISTERED VOTERS	REGISTRATION CENTERS	POLLING STATIONS	VOTES	%
Dili						
Liquiça						
Alleu						
<b>(Sub-total)</b>	<b>Dili</b>	<b>104,471</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>203</b>		
Covalima						
AINARO						
Manufahi						
<b>(Sub-total)</b>	<b>Sual</b>	<b>74,945</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>148</b>		
Baucau						
Manatuto						
<b>(Sub-total)</b>	<b>Baucau</b>					
Bobonaro	Maliana	45,306	22	89		
Lautém	Los Palos	28,266	14	55		
Viqueque	Viqueque	36,369	14	68		
Ermera	Ermera	47,363	20	88		
Ambeno	Oecussi	28,151	11	53		
<b>Timor-Leste 13</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>438,517</b>	<b>200</b>	<b>850</b>		
Indonesia		3,800	5	11		
Lisbon		2,203	1	4		
New York		13	1	1		
Maputo		52	1	1		
Macau		149	1	1		
Austrália		7,062	4	17		
<b>(Sub-total)</b>		<b>13,279</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>35</b>		
<b>General Total</b>		<b>451,796</b>	<b>213</b>	<b>885</b>	<b>446,953</b>	<b>98,9%</b>
<b>Valid Votes</b>					<b>438,968</b>	<b>98,2%</b>
<b>Invalid Votes</b>					<b>7,985</b>	<b>1,8%</b>
<b>In favor of Autonomy</b>					<b>94,388</b>	<b>21,5%</b>
<b>In favor of Independence</b>					<b>344,580</b>	<b>78,5%</b>

## Credits for original photographs

Photograph courtesy of  
UNMIT, Communications and Public Information Office



Photograph courtesy of  
Ross Bird



Photograph courtesy of  
UNMIT, Communications and Public Information Office



Photograph courtesy of  
UNMIT, Communications and Public Information Office



Photograph courtesy of  
UNMIT, Communications and Public Information Office



Photograph courtesy of  
UNMIT, Communications and Public Information Office



Photograph courtesy of  
UNMIT, Communications and Public Information Office



Photograph courtesy of  
UNMIT, Communications and Public Information Office



Photograph courtesy of  
UNMIT, Communications and Public Information Office



## Referências Bibliográficas Bibliography

- 1) Teles, Patrícia Galvão. *Autodeterminação em Timor-Leste: dos Acordos de Nova Iorque à Consulta Popular de 30 de Agosto de 1999*. Documentação e Direito Comparado, n.º 79/80. 1999  
<http://www.gddc.pt/actividade-editorial/pdfs-publicacoes/7980-d.pdf>.
- 2) <http://www.un.org/depts/dpko/missions/unmissetlocal/unmisset/factsandfigures.html>.
- 3) Dunn, James. *East Timor: a rough passage to independence*. Australia: MacPhersons Printing. 2003.
- 4) Duran, Frédéric. *East Timor, A Country at the Crossroads of Asia and the Pacific, A Geo-Historical Atlas*. Bangkok: Silkworm Books. 2006.
- 5) <http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/Untaetchrono.html>
- 6) Bulletin EU 5-1999 (pt):1.3.13  
<http://europa.eu/bulletin/pt/9905/p103013.htm>.
- 7) Secretário-Geral das Nações Unidas. *Relatório de 22 de Maio de 1999 (S/1999/595)*.
- 8) Commonwealth of Australia, Senate Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade References Committee. *Final Report on the Inquiry into East Timor*. Senate Printing Unit, Parliament House, Canberra. 1999.
- 9) Martin, Ian. *Self-determination in East Timor: the United Nations, the ballot, and the international intervention*. United States of America: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 2001.
- 10) Secretário-Geral das Nações Unidas. *Relatório de 20 de Julho de 1999 (S/1999/803) e Carta para o Conselho de Segurança de 26 de Julho de 1999 (S/1999/822)*.
- 11) Secretário-Geral das Nações Unidas. *Carta de 28 de Julho de 1999 (S/1999/830)*.
- 12) Timor-Leste Memória, [http://amrtimor.org/crono/Index\\_por\\_ano.php?ano=1999](http://amrtimor.org/crono/Index_por_ano.php?ano=1999)
- 13) Secretário-Geral das Nações Unidas. 3 de Setembro de 1999 (S/1999/944).
- 14) Gomes, José Júlio Pereira. *O Referendo de 30 de Agosto de 1999 em Timor-Leste*. Portugal, Gradiva – Publicações, L.ª. 1.ª edição: Julho de 2001.

## Outras publicações consultadas Other consulted publications

- Greenlees, Don and Garran, Robert.  
*Deliverance: the inside story of East Timor's fight for freedom*. Australia: Allen and Unwin. 2002.
- Taudevin, Lansell.  
*East Timor- too little too late*. NSW, Australia: Duffy and Snellgrove. 1999.
- Nicol, Bill.  
*Timor: a Nation Reborn*. Asia: Equinox Publishing PTE. Ltd. 2002.
- Documento Dare II  
<http://www.etan.org/et99/july/1-7/02dare.htm>



Os últimos passos da  
**Libertação  
Nacional**  
Cronologia

Haket ikus nlan ba  
**Libertasaun  
Nasional**  
Kronolojia

On the verge of  
**National  
Liberation**  
Chronology



REPÚBLICA DEMOCRÁTICA DE  
**TIMOR-LESTE**